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Introduction 
I T  IS SAFE TO contend that many individuals might not consider it 
insulting to be referred to as ethnonationalists, because the concept generally 
implies the love for one's ethnic group (e.g., Mandingo, Jewish, Serbian, 
Yoruba, Zulu, Russian, etc). Yet, there is often a hidden problem stemming 
from the psychological and primordial attachment to one's ethnic group in a 
pluralistic society. The  situation, in a polity, such as Nigeria, becomes more 
problematic when the politics of who gets what, when, and how gravitate 
toward ethnic clashes and antagonisms. T o  this end, this study seeks to do the 
following: 1. examine briefly the revival of the issue of ethnonationalism in 
Nigerian politics in light of the contemporary debate on state formation; 2. 
suggest possible ways to ameliorate and mitigate the centrifugal tendencies of 
ethnonationalism in the republic. 
Generally, the assumption has always been that an adequate education was 
likely to induce the various collectivities to peel off or at least modify their 
ethnic identities-a move that could result in the superimposition of nation- 
state nationalism upon ethnic loyalties. In other words, theoretically, education 
would retard and weaken the noncentripetal dimensions of ethnicity. There 
might be some truth to this thesis, since many of'those who have been in the 
vanguard in opposition to ethnic politics have traditionally come from the 
educated cadres. But, there are also many in this group who have, in the 
struggle for power, resurrected their ethnic emblems and solidarity, as rallying 
cries in the competition for the authoritative allocation of values. 
Probably, it was that sense of an  innate ethnic unity in different groups that 
prompted N. Kofele Kale to contend, inter alia, that: 1. attachment to ethnic 
group values-by so-called tribesmen-holds true for the majority of people 
living in polyethnic societies and 2. these values are held onto by an ethnic man 
[or person] regardless of environmental variations (education, job or position); 
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i.e., an ethnic [person] remains ethnic whether domiciled in a rural village or in 
an urban center.' For example, Ebino Babatope, minister of Transport and 
Aviation, in the Abacha administration, in an interview with The Sentinel said: 
"... And if people think that because I am a minister that I have forgotten the 
fact that one, I'm an Ileshaman, two, I'm an Ijeshaman, and third, I'm a 
Yorubaman, then fourth, I am a Nigerian citizen, then such people should 
really go and examine themselves. I cannot divorce myself from the yearning 
and aspirations of the people of my roots."* 
As Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle have argued, the political 
equation becomes more confounding and discordant in democratic and plu- 
ralistic societies. They have noted that a sense of communal solidarity tends to 
intensify ethnic preference, so much so, that, in the struggle for political power, 
to promise less for one's group in the name of harmony and accommodation 
was tantamount to betraying that group's interest.3 Little wonder, then, that 
Umaru Dikko, an influential minister in the Second Republic of Nigeria, was 
alleged to have expressed, proverbially, his concern regarding the inauguration 
of a National Conference by the Abacha administration-a conference 
intended to work out the modalities for the formation of Nigeria's nation-state. 
He said: "No man becomes a hero by selling his father's house to buy a land."" 
What Dikko was implying, it has been contended, was that Abacha (a north- 
erner) was, by the nature or scope of the National Conference that he had set 
up, selling off the northern interests without being cognizant of what he would 
get in return for the north. This assertion, attributed to Dikko, was later 
refuted.Vut the moral of the proverb is applicable to many ethnic groups in 
the politics of pluralistic societies. In a real sense, the foregoing discussion was 
intended to provide the springboard from which to examine the serious and 
possible rationale for the perennial and resurgent debates on the quest to 
balkanize Nigeria into ethnic states. This was a view articulated in a written 
statement entitled "Memorandum on the proposal for restructuring Nigeria by 
the Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of Africa" (EMIROAF)." 
Ethnicity: A Conceptual Overview 
What is ethnicity? Okwudiba Nnoli provides the following definitional and 
interactive characteristics of ethnicity, especially in the African case: 
First, it is a social phenomenon inherent in the various forms of interactions 
between and among members of different ethnic cleavages. Ethnic groups are 
social formations distinguished by the communal nature of their boundaries. 
The pertinent communal factor may be language, culture, or both. In the 
African continent, language has a tendency to be a significant defining factor. 
Let it suffice to say, however, that as social formations, ethnic collectivities are 
not necessarily homogeneous entities, even linguistically and culturally. Addi- 
tionally, relations between ethnic groups in a political system tend to heighten 
and produce ethnicity. 
-I "- '- - p u L I  
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Second, much more than ethnocentrism, ethnicity is characterized by a 
common consciousness of being one in relation to the other relevant ethnic 
groups. This is particularly so, when one views ethnicity in ideological terms- 
i.e., ethnicity construed to be the manner of thinking characteristic of a 
cleavage; and, in the African case often furthered by the ascriptive traditional 
African social patterns. 
Third, exclusiveness is an attribute of ethnicity. Thus in the sociological 
lingo, ingroup-outgroup boundaries emerge and come to the fore. Conse- 
quently, acceptance and rejection on linguistic and cultural grounds character- 
ize social relations. 
In sum, conflict is a significant dimension of ethnicity, and this is where the 
ideology becomes problematic in endeavors toward the successful governance 
of most African polities (as, for example, in Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, 
South Africa, etc). This is inevitable under conditions of inter-ethnic contesta- 
tion in the politics of the authoritative allocation of values. Indeed, the tussle is 
aggravated by the scarcity of valuable resources, especially in political systems, 
where one's prestige is measured by an individual's wealth. One could only be 
wealthy if there are poor folks. So, the acceptance of inequality nourishes the 
allurement for material possession. The apprehension of being left out or 
behind in the struggle for economic and political power often generates divisive 
and destructive socioeconomic competition and behavior patterns. In some 
cases, the Nkhrumahist dictum, "Seek ye first the political kingdom-and the 
rest shall be added onto you," reigns supreme, and sharpens the in-group 
solidarity. Aggressive behavior, concluded Nnoli, may be used to limit competi- 
tion in favor of the in-group. In such a political milieu, demonstrations, rioting, 
and various forms of agitation become major instruments in inter-ethnic rela- 
tions and rivalry.7 
The Relevance of Ethnicity as an Analytical Tool 
Bernard E. Segal has contended thal "although ethnicity is a far older basis 
of social organization than either the nation-state or systems of rank based 
more on classes and less on status groups, it does not lose its salience as these 
other forms develop around it."8 
When in December 1958, the First Conference of the Peoples of Africa was 
convened in Accra, Gold Coast (modern Ghana), it issued a proclamation on 
tribalism [or ethnicity], vehemently condemning the imperialist tactics of 
manipulating it for the perpetuation of colonial domination. The participants 
at this convocation termed tribalism a vicious system which represented an 
ominous impediment to the achievement of African unity. The meeting, noted 
R.N. Ismagilova, not only called on political associations, trade unions, cultural 
groups and other organizations to take the appropriate steps to thwart the 
cankerworm of tribalism, but also called upon the governments of independent 
African countries to promulgate legislation aimed at combating and assuaging 
this phenomenon. In particular it suggested that propaganda and education be 
Cowright O 2001. All Rights Reserved 
162 E. IKE UDOGU 
used to achieve this ~ b j e c t i v e . ~  In spite of that, however, attempts to depoliti- 
cize ethnicity have met with mixed results, but this by no means implies this 
goal is unattainable. 
In the Nigerian case, paradoxically, many Nigerian leaders argued that the 
eradication of tribalism could help in mitigating the perplexing problems the 
country was confronted with, and yet, have done very little to mollify its effect 
in the politics of Nigeria.IO 
In fact, it is vexing that in spite ofthe proclamations against the "evils" of 
tribalism, its significance in the analysis of political behavior patterns in many 
polities remains salient. This is true in Nigeria and elsewhere.ll 
T o  go back to the central issue of the foregoing analysis, is ethnicity 
relevant in the politics of Nigeria? Put another way, could the complex political 
interactions in Nigeria be seen and be comprehended against the backdrop of 
the country's ethnic mosaic? Indeed, such a query might appear to be naive 
even to a casual observer of the politics in pluralistic societies. The  Nigerian 
civil war, the carnage in Bosnia-Herzogovina and Rwanda, for example, illus- 
trate the problematic nature of the politics of ethnonationalism. The question, 
though, is whether observers and scholars have placed too much emphasis on 
ethnicity as an independent variable, at least in the African case, in explaining 
the political topsy-turvy situation and the commotion on the continent. 
Nnoli contends that numerous pitfalls attend any endeavor to explicate the 
ethnic phenomenon [and puzzle] in Africa. First, such an endeavor may 
succeed in keeping ethnic sentiments aflame by bringing them to the fore of the 
consciousness of the informed public. Second, it may arouse or generate 
divisive inter-ethnic controversy --since ethnicity is a very sensitive issue in 
national politics.l2 But the question of ethnic "autonomy" in all its forms and 
ramifications may not wither away within a nation-state in the struggle for 
ethnic-groups survival. The Quebecois in Canada, and the Zulus in South 
Africa arc two cases in point. 
It is inadequate to concentrate on, or over-emphasize, the impact of 
ethnicity in African politics, as some scholars have argued, since there dre other 
equally significant variables that must be noted in explaining the intricacies 
and complexities of African politics. In particular, some have contended that 
concerns should be directed to the role played by participants in the social 
production process. Arguably, a focus on such a process permits the scholar to 
discern historical epochs which could help to illuminate and clarify the trend 
and direction of social movements.'? 
Arche Mafeje has argued that tribalism is an anachronistic misnomer 
which tends to "blur" cross-cultural analysis by making discriminatory and 
resentful distinctions between Africa and other polities in the world. As a result 
of such a process, some scholars oversimplify, and indeed mystify and obscure, 
the true nature of economic and power relations among Africans and their 
complex interactions within the global economic system.I4 B. Magubane has 
contended that a focus on ethnicity obstructs a genuine effort to comprehend 
African societies, principally because it does not accentuate the ownership and 
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control of the primary productive forces.15 Politically, Richard Sklar shares the 
view that a focus on ethnicity obscures the fact that, in Africa, ethnic move- 
ments may be encouraged and incited to action by the political "princes" who 
accede to power and use it to further their invididual and group interests. In a 
way, therefore, ethnicity becomes a mask for class privileges.'" 
Nnoli argues that, quite aside from the narrow focus on ethnicity, there is 
the whole issue of what weight should be attributed to it as an explanatory 
variable. The tendency is to point to ethnic discrepancies and view these 
antinomies as the principal ones in African societies. In Africa, "ethnic prob- 
lems are readily apparent and very real. But this is only at the level of more 
empirical observation. Ethnic contradictions have an objective basis in the 
social structure of society. As an element of the ideological superstructure of 
society, ethnicity rests on, is functional for, and is determined by the infrastruc- 
ture of society, the mode of production [and distribution]."'7 
The Debate on the Creation of Ethnic States 
To some observers of Nigerian politics, it is perplexing that, on the "eve" of 
the twenty-first century, some Nigerians are suggesting the formation of states 
along ethnic lines to supersede the existing formation. What this implies is that 
the public pronouncements and constiti~tional engineering (as for example, the 
1979 constitution) to eliminate ethnicity in the republic's politics have so far 
been in vain. Clearly, the primordial sentiments and attachment to ethnicity in 
the face of national dificulties can easily be resurrected to take on a high 
profile. In other words, its renaissance reflects the nature of the political milieu 
at a given epoch. 
Historically, the debate concerning the balkanization of Nigeria into geo- 
ethnic entities is not novel. Its genesis could be traced to the amalgamation of 
the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914. Indeed, there is a paradox 
flowing from the fact that the British, who were responsible for this arrange- 
ment, did not pursue the political unification question with enthusiasm. It was 
possible that some of the Nigerian political actors observing the British genre of 
governance may have been influenced by it. For example, Governor Sir Hugh 
Clifford in his address to the Nigerian Council on December 29, 1920, stated: 
... It is the constant policy of the Nigerian government to maintain and support the local tribal 
institutions and the indigenous forms of government. ... Assuming ... that the impossible were 
feasible-that this collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native states, 
separated from one another, as many of them are, by great distance, by difference of history 
and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers, were 
indeed capable of being welded into a singlc homogeneous nation a deadly blow would be 
struck at  the very root of national self-govrrnment in Nigeria which secures to each scparate 
people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality ... and the peculiar 
political and social institutions which have evolved for it by the wisdom and by the accumu- 
lated experiences of generations of its forbrarers.ln 
It has been contended elsewhere that such a British stance served to fortify 
the Nigerian "tribal" groups' ethnic walls.'Vndeed, there is little wonder that 
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the political "princes" who inherited power from the British colonial "mon- 
archies" reaffirmed and paraphrased Governor Clifford's assertion as they 
jockeyed for political power before independence in 1960. 
For instance, in 1948, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a leader of the Northern 
People's Congress (NPC), during one of Nigeria's constitutional conferences 
asserted that: "Since the amalgamation of the north and the south provinces in 
1914, Nigeria had existed as one country on paper. ... It is still far from being 
united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country."'o Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, himself a flagbearer of the Action Group (AG), wrote in 
1947: "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographic expression. There arc 
not 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English,' 'Welsh,' or 'French'. 
The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who 
live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not."21 
The political alignment pattern in the pre-and post-independence periods 
was ethnically based,2' and the outcome of the political competition, at least in 
the past thirty years (or two Republics), was determined by the solidarity of the 
major ethnic cleavages (Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba)." So, the politics of 
ethnonationalsm" in the struggle for power in Nigeria is commonplace but 
disturbing, because of its conflictual and contentious characteristic in the 
Nigerian polity. 
Thus, the manifesto propounded by the Ethnic Minority Rights Organiza- 
tion of Africa (EMIROAF), for the creation or states on the basis of ethnic 
chasms, as a way out of the perpetual political crisis in the country, is perturb- 
ing against the background of Nigeria's ethno-political history. It is, therefore, 
on the views of this group that I now focus my following analysis. 
EMIROAF and Ethnic States in  Nigeria 
It  is somewhat contradictory that this organization should assume the 
acronym EMIRAOF instead of EMIRON (Ethnic Minority Rights of Nigeria). 
Perhaps the adoption of EMIROAF implies that the problems of ethnic minor- 
ities extended beyond Nigeria. And, given Nigeria's size and clout in the 
African continent, there existed the likelihood that it could serve as a frame- 
work for other nation-states in the area that are confronted with a similar 
imbroglio. The issue, however, is not the group's nomenclature (i.e., 
EMIROAF, EMIRON, etc) so much as its motives, and the republic's accep- 
tance (or refusal) of the organization's proclamations. 
The proceeding discussion is intended to highlight some of the major points 
made by the group about what it perceived to be the model that might resolve 
the country's endemic political crisis and malaise. Moreover, attempts will be 
made to examine these opinions to ascertain their efficacy (or lack of it) in 
Nigeria's political metamorphoses. In a real sense, the discussion of the group's 
viewpoint issues not from the viability as an adequate or inadequate option for 
Nigeria, but from its exponential values as the country examines itself 
politically. 
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In its preamble, EMIROAF contends that, "it seeks to correct the faults 
which led to the collapse of the First Republic and to return the country from 
the abyss of unitarianism into which military adventurism has led it. Accor- 
dingly, it advocates a loose federation with a collegiate presidency, a parlia- 
mentary system of govenment in the federating units of the country, an army in 
the territorial formation, and the enthronement of true federalism in Nigeria by 
the equal treatment of all ethnic groups, allowing to each ethnic group the right 
of political self-determination, resources and environmental contr01."2~ 
As scholars familiar with the politics of Nigeria know, this position is 
probably predicated on the frustration stemming from the problem of leader- 
ship which has eluded the republic, and the politics of the zero-sum-game, 
which is responsible in part for the country's instability. Such instability mar- 
ginalizes the ethnic minority groups which seek a stable government on which 
to press for their demands. The politics of Nigeria become particularly baMing 
when the majority groups use their numerical strength to accede to power and 
to use that position to satisfy their constituencies which elected them at the 
seeming expense of the minority ethnic groups. This situation becomes more 
problematic for the minority groups who must be "punished" for not support- 
ing the party in government. Thus, resources and amenities are often denied 
them just to teach them a lesson for backing the wrong political horse. Whereas 
this instrumentality and strategy in politics is not peculiarly or uniquely 
Nigerian, the very form which it takes is often blatant and impedes Nigeria's 
quest for political atomism. 
Arguably, EMIROAF is more concerned with the apportionment of the 
country's natural resources than with the ethnic strata of the nation-state. This 
view is given credence by its contention that the organization's formula would 
render it impossible for any group in power to usurp the resources of any ethnic 
group for its own purposes. The group recommends that, "all on-shore mineral 
resources shall be the property of the unit in which they are found ..."26 
Accordingly, as part of the political configuration in Nigeria, the following 
groups will form ethnic states: 1.  Ijaw; 2. Yoruba; 3. Igbo; 4. Hausa-Fulani; 5. 
Ibibio; 6. Kanuri; 7. Edo; 8. Nupe; 9. Urhobo; 10. Tiv; and 11. Gbagyi.2' 
To  be sure, the group addressed the institutional and structural issues of the 
anticipated nation-state under the rubrics of the collegiate presidency, political 
parties, elections, bureaucracy, revenue, education, defence, local government, 
police, security agencies, foreign affairs? the judiciary and movement of people, 
inter alia.Z8 The discussion of these dimensions, however, is not within the 
purview of this disquisition. Moreover, the above institutions and structures are 
secondary and peripheral, for, in a true sense, they rest on Nigeria's economic 
superstructure- i.e., how the republic's resources are allocated. But the bot- 
tom line is that a group must first capture political power in order to distribute 
the economic resources. The minority ethnic groups at this juncture in 
Nigerian politics are not in the position to capture power and oversee the 
dispensation of resources. Is there any wonder about the allure for the creation 
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of ethnic states that could enable them to use their resources for geo-ethnic 
development? 
In addition, the frustration stemming from the exploitation of oil, the 
country's major source of income, at the expense of the areas producing it, has 
made some ethnonationalists vent their anger on behalf of their groups by 
agitating for ethnic autonomy. A good case in point is Isaac Boro's preoccupa- 
tion with the creation of a state for the Ijaw ethnic group out of the erstwhile 
eastern Nigeria~-- a clamor that reached its crescendo in the pre-civil war era 
(1 967- 1970).z9 The  struggle was instigated, among other factors, by the pre- 
sumed marginalization of the people, and underdevelopment of the oil-rich 
area. 
EMIROAF's opinion should be seen for what it is-~-an expression of' the 
dissatisfaction flowing from the marginalization of some of the ethnic minority 
groups, nourished by the wanton, rampant, and endemic corruption in Nigeria, 
rather than political opportunism per sc. 
Further, the 1994 Constitutional Conference, also dubbed the Abacha 
Conference (because it was conceived by Abacha), intended to thrash out the 
modality for the republic's future operation and sustainment, has only served to 
sharpen the ethnic chasms in the country, as each group coalesces to pursue its 
ethnic interests and agendas within the nation-state. For instance, the Commit- 
tee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) in Nigeria noted concernedly 
that: "The manner [in which the] political elite, traditional rulers and the 
ruling class arc organizing preconference along regional lines was aimcd at 
promoting primordial sentiments. ... Such conferences as the Northern Elders 
Meeting [Hausa-Fulani], the Western Elders Forum [Yoruba], and the Igbo 
Leaders Forum [Igbo] are not only ethnically oriented but they are also sending 
dangerous signals across the country [reminiscent of the pre- and post-indepen- 
dence alignment patterns.] "3" In previous attempts at democratic governance, 
such alignment patterns contributed to the political instability and angst in the 
country. 
In light of those developments, is it not plausible to contend in the words of 
Colin Legum that "tribalism" was Nigeria's natural condition and was likely to 
remain so for a long time to come?"2 This situation is fostered and intensified 
by what James S. Coleman termed pan-tribal sentiment, brought about by the 
interaction which modernity makes possible.:':j 
So far, the argument for the balkanization of the Nigerian polity into ethnic 
states has no attracted significant political disciples among a cross-section of 
the Nigt:rian political elite. This by no means implies that the issue is dead. At 
lcast, this has been the case, for the moment perhaps, because of the imprac- 
ticalitie inherent in the politics of contemporary Nigeria. Indeed, few have 
esprcsscd this v i t .1~  as succinctly and emphatically as the statesman and former 
head of statc.. Oluseguri Obasan.jo, when he stated at the Arewa Workshop on, 
"State o l ' t hc  Nation, Which Way Forward", that: 
'l'hr intcrwovc,nncss anti complcmc.n!arity of' thC various aspects of our national l i k  [ in 
K i g u i a ]  111akc ,I I~rc ;~kul )  toc;lll) ~~ndvsir;tt)lv and  alrnost i n ~ p o s ~ i b l r .  I! rnay hc ;~ssumc>d. 
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therefore, that the recent agitations from some minority sections are not unconnected with 
the mismanagement of our resources, particularly those resources emanating from the 
minority areas and the apparent competition among the majority groups.34 
Germane to this analysis is the assumption that those agitating for the 
creation of ethnic states are possibly doing so because the efforts, hopes and 
desires of their collectivities are baffled and thwarted in Nigeria's contempor- 
ary political matrix. Probably, when these frustrations and anxieties are 
addressed, their quest for ethnic states might be mollified. But the political 
depth of the attachment to ethnonationalism in the politics of the republic is so 
profound that it must not be taken for granted. How might the question and 
complexity of ethnonationalism in Nigeria's politics be tackled, in order to 
mitigate its noncentripetal dimensions? This will be the central focus of the 
proceeding discussion. 
Possible Solutions 
Providing solutions to the centrifugal and endemic problems of ethnic 
politics in the struggle for power and the authoritative allocation of values in 
Nigeria is problematic. The continued allure of ethnonationalism issues form 
the sociopolitical rewards of one's attachment to it. This is so because the 
success of ethnic nationalism offers the ethnic nationalist easy access to mobil- 
ize the group in the struggle for the national distribution of goods and ser- 
vices.35 This has been the situation before and after independence. The result 
was that even some of the founding fathers of the country (Abubakar, Zik, and 
Awolowo) sought solace in their ethnic regions (north, east and west). Indeed, 
Richard Sklar has contended that, in the struggle for political supremacy and 
the control of amenities in the First Republic, the "regional party leaders 
operated highly effective systems of patronage dispensing jobs, contracts, com- 
mercial loans, ... and scholarships. Young people in all parts of the country were 
pressured in various ways to support the regional government parties. ... Opin- 
ions followed interest, and many young adults furthered their careers by 
adopting regionalist principles and tribalist ideologies."36 
Whereas solutions to the problems of ethnonationalism in Nigerian politics 
are numerous and sometimes contradictory, I will briefly examine four feasible 
solutions in this essay. These are the constitution, the state, political culture 
and education. 
One of the raisons d'ztre of the Abacha Conference is the writing of a new 
constitution, which will, among other factors, resolve the political antinomies 
rendering the Nigerian polity ungovernable. The 1979 constitution, which 
suggested ways for creating ethnic harmony, was a fundamental step in the 
direction of providing a solution to the ethnic problems in Nigeria. For 
instance, Art. 14 (3) of the 1979 constitution states that: "The composition of 
the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its 
affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of 
Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national 
Cowright O 2001. All Rights Reserved 
168 E. IKE UDOGU 
loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a 
few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or 
in any of its agencies."?7 This provision should remain intact in any future 
politico-constitutional paradigm or framework. Indeed, it is a sine qua non for 
the furtherance of ethnic harmony in the republic, because it recognizes the 
significance of every ethnic group in the ethnic mosaic that is Nigeria. 
Second, the recognition of Nigeria's ethnic "melting pot" could be pro- 
moted by realizing and acknowledging the supremacy of the state as the 
agglutinating mechanism of the various ethnic cleavages. The assumption is 
that the state plays the role of assuaging the conflicting interests of the ethnic 
groups, which could further stability. But what is a state? According to Cou- 
loumbis and Wolfe, a state is a "political unit defined in terms of territory, 
population, and autonomous government that exercises effective control of the 
territory and its inhabitants regardless of their ethnic homogeneity or hetero- 
gene it^."^^ In the Nigerian case the question has always been the extent to 
which ethnonationalists have declared their allegiance to the autonomous 
government. In truth, some minority ethnic groups have sought to withhold 
their allegiance to the central government because their needs have been 
ignored. It was Plato who asserted in the Republic that: "Our aim in founding 
the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class [or ethnic 
group], but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a state 
which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole be most likely to find 
justice and the ill-ordered state, injustice."?' 
Pressed to wax philosophically, many Nigerianists, especially the political 
observers, may agree that the three major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Ibo 
and Yoruba) have dominated the political and economic spheres of Nigeria to 
the chagrin or disappointment of the minority groups. This condition and 
perception only furthers the attraction to ethnonationalism, especially among 
the minority groups who suffer from political and economic marginalization. 
To  combat their alienation, the Nigerian state must strive for an equitable 
distribution of the national resources and wealth. In short, it must promulgate 
policies aimed at political and economic enfranchisement of all Nigerians. 
Third, as Claude Ake contended, the establishment of a political culture 
that could command national legitimacy is essential for successful governing in 
Nigeria. In fact, he has argued that the basic problem of unity in Nigeria has 
two dimensions: 1. how to elicit deference and devotion to the claims of the 
state from its subjects (implying the conversion of ethnic nationalism to nation- 
state nationalism); and 2. how to increase normative consensus governing 
political behavior among members of the political system. This means that the 
problem of national unity entails developing a political culture and urging the 
people's commitment to it.40 So, the need to devise an efficacious political 
culture for the republic is imperative. 
Fourth, it is a given that solutions to Nigeria's myriad political problems 
from the right and left of the ideological spectrum abound. But it is one thing to 
prescribe solutions to a problem and quite another to implement them. The 
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implementation issue becomes more problematic if aimed at those who have 
been "corrupted" by the system. To  this end, it has been contended elsewhere 
that in order to combat the country's future political malaise and disarticula- 
tion, the republic should embark on a political education of its "uncorrupted" 
youth. Such an education should emphasize the following dimensions: 1. 
Politics is a variable sum game; 2. National interests supersede individual, 
parochial, provincial and regional interests; 3. Political parties represent 
national interests, not just party members interests; 4. The respect for human 
rights; and 5. Freedom of expres~ion.~ '  
The process of tackling ethnic concerns in Nigerian politics is not an easy 
one, because of the sensitivity of the subject matter. The preceding discussion 
was intended to contribute to the debate as the Abacha administration con- 
fronts the onerous task of designing a political framework that could resolve the 
politico-social and religio-economic antinomies inherent in the Nigerian polity. 
Nigerians will never peel off their ethnic identity; nor is it necessary to do so. 
However, the threat of disintegration into macro and micro ethnic states, a la 
EMIROAF, could be averted if Nigerians, regardless of geo-ethnic origin, are 
provided equality of opportunity, justice, and fair play. 
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